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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED
THE SEGREGATION QUESTION

Alfred H. Kelly•
sixty years ago in Plessy v. Ferguson/ the Supreme Court
of the United States adopted the now celebrated "separate
but equal" doctrine as a constitutional guidepost for state segregation statutes. Justice Brown's opinion declared that state statutes
imposing racial segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, provided only that the statute in question guaranteed equal
facilities for the two races. Brown's argument rested on a historical
theory of the intent, although he offered no evidence to support it.
"The object of the amendment," he said, "was undoubtedly to
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but
in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either."2
Justice Harlan alone attacked the majority's historical interpretation. The intent of the amendment, he insisted, was to "protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship," so
that "in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
. . . no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens" and "Our
Constitution is color-blind."3 So did the former slaveholder and
opponent of abolition speak to the revolutionary intent of the
amendment: its purpose had been, he thought, to destroy all caste
and racial class legislation in the United States.4

S

OME

• Ph.B. 1931, A.M. 1934, Ph.D. 1938, University of Chicago; Professor of History and
Chairman of the Department of History, Wayne University; co-author (with W. A. Harbison} of The American Constitution: Its Origins arid Development (1948, 1955). The author
was responsible in large part for the historical research embodied in the appellants' brief
on reargument of the school segregation cases prior to the decision of May 17, 1954.-Ed.
1163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).
2Id. at 544.
3Id. at 555.
4 Harlan had clearly anticipated his Plessy position in his dissent in the Civil Rights
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Whose history was correct, Brown's or Harlan's? Did the
framers of the amendment intend to guarantee only certain Negro
rights but preserve at the same time the legal base of the caste
system in the several states, or did they intend to destroy entirely
the constitutional foundation for all caste and racial class legislation under state law? In the context of our own day, did the
framers intend to strike down "separate but equal" school legislation, Jim Crow laws, and the like, or did they not?
To be sure, the Supreme Court of late years has exhibited a
decided tendency to consign Justice Brown's theory of intent to
the limbo of dead and forgotten constitutional doctrines. In the
School Segregation Cases,° the Court raised the question of intent
for reargument, but then cast the historical question aside as one
impossible of solution and decided the cases instead upon a sociological theory of the meaning of equality in the twentieth century.6
Thus the Court burie_d Brown's theory without formally refuting
it. But for the constitutional historian the question still has vast
meaning: who was right, Brown or Harlan?
Historical problems seldom have the grace to resolve themselves precisely in terms of the issues which emerge a _hundred
or a thousand years later. The "separate but equal" controversy
is no exception. The phrase "separate but equal" appears nowhere
in the debates on the amendment, nor so far as I know in the
popular discussions outside Congress or in the state legislatures.
But this does not imply that the Brown-Harlan dispute is historically meaningless. "Separate but equal" legislation is caste legislation; it is statutory classification by race. Did the framers intend
to destroy state racial class legislation and classification by race,
or did they not?
Any examination of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment must begin by taking account of the important historical
scholarship of Graham, tenBroek, and others, who have established
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 26, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883), where he defended the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. L. 335. This statute, among other things, guaranteed the
"full and equal enjoyment" by all persons without regard to race-of the facilities of inns,
public conveyances, and the like. Harlan had asserted that the rights in question were
"legal, not social rights" and properly fell within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The supreme law of the land," he had added, now provided that "no authority
shall be exercised in this country upon the basis of discrimination • • • because of • • •
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3· at 59, 62,
3 S.Ct. 18 (1883).
5
6

Brown v. Board of Education, of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972, 73 S.Ct. 1114 (1953).
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).
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quite conclusively that the Fourteenth Amendment both in general
ideology and legal phrase was a product of radical pre-war antislavery theory. 7 The antislavery idealists of the generation after
1830 were thoroughly convinced that the institution of slavery
violated profoundly the premises of the Declaration of Independence, the doctrine of natural law and natural rights, and the
"higher law" origins of all constitutional government. Orthodox
constitutional theory as exemplified by Marshall, Taney, Story,
Kent, and Webster, however, provided them with only limited
means for a direct constitutional assault upon the institution of
slavery, which stood safely within the protective folds of a federal
constitutional system and limited national sovereignty. But the
more radical antislavery idealists, with a fine disregard for orthodox
constitutional law, proceeded to evolve a constitutional doctrine
of their own, which if carried into practice ,vould dispose decisively
of the problem of slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment ultimately
was a product of their theorizing.
The fundamental constitutional concept of the radical antislavery theorists was the doctrine of national citizenship, to which
in turn were presumed to be attached a comprehensive body of
natural rights and civil liberties. The doctrine of national citizenship was expounded by W.W. Ellsworth and Calvin Goddard as
early as 1834 when they contended that the comity clause in
Article IV guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states actually conferred a national citizenship upon
all Americans, white and Negro.8 Happily enough for the antislavery idealists, Justice Bushrod Washington in a federal circuit
court case had set forth in some detail a long list of civil liberties
guaranteed by this clause as a matter of interstate comity.9 For the
antislavery idealist, the comity clause accordingly became thereafter a national bill of rights translating into positive law the injunctions of higher law doctrine.
Significantly, the immediate constitutional right most often
invoked by antislavery theorists was that of "the equal protection
7Graham, "The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment," 1950
WIS. L. REV. 479, 610; TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND•
MENT (1951).
8 Crandall v. Connecticut, 10 Conn. 339 at 348 (1836).
9 Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546 at 551-552, No. 3230. This case,
insignificant as it appears, is in reality of vast importance in determining the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. They repeatedly cited Justice Washington's dictum
on the meaning of "privileges and immunities" during the debates on the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and on the amendment itself.
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of the laws," an idea that occurred again and again in antislavery
literature.10 "Equal protection" had virtually no antecedent legal
history; instead it grew out of the antislavery radicals' humanitarian
emphasis upon absolute human equality according to their reading of the Declaration of Independence. Henry B. Stanton and
Charles Olcott introduced the thought to abolitionist propaganda
in the 1830's,11 and Charles Sumner translated it into constitutional
doctrine in the Roberts case,12 where he derived the guarantee from
the provision in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 that "All
men are born free and equal. ..." 13 In the late 1850's, John A.
Bingham of Ohio, the future principal author of the Fourteenth
Amendment, repeatedly expounded the idea in debate on the floor
of the House of Representatives. In a speech on the floor of the
House of Representatives in January 1857, for example, he
declared, "It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and
the equal protection of each, are principles of our Constitution
. . ." as "universal and indestructible~ the human race."14
In the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and in similar
provisions in the bills of rights of the several state constitutions
the abolitionists found another legal weapon which they proceeded
to shape to their own interests. It is common legal knowledge that
"ciue process of law" as it came down through centuries of English
and early American usage, had a purely procedural content; put
simply, it meant justice in a criminal trial or civil case.15 However, long before the courts in Wynehamer v. New York16 and Dred
10 Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,'"
50 COI.. L. R.Ev. 131 (1950); TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 96 et seq. (1951).
11 REMARKS OF HENRY B. STANTON IN THE REPRESENTATIVE HALL ••• BEFORE THE COM•
MITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETIS (1837); AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 68 n. (1839); OLCOTT, LEcTuRE5 ON SLAVERY AND
ABOLITION 18 (1838).
12 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850).
13 MASS. CONST., art. I, Part First (1780).
_
14 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., appendix, 140 (1857).
15 The doctrine of vested rights with its restrictive substantive implications had
already received specific recognition as early as the Federalist period, but before 1850 the
courts rested it almost entirely upon the contracts clause or upon the fundamental nature
of all constitutional government. WRIGHT, THJt CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1938). On the early meaning of due process, see Corwin, "The Doctrine of Due Process
of Law before the Civil War," 24 HARv. L. REv 366, 460 (1911), reprinted in l SELECTED
EssAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 203 (1938); Grant, "The Natural Law Background of Due
Process," 31 CoL.·L. REv. 56 (1931); Howe, "The Meaning of 'Due Process of Law' Prior
to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment," 18 CALIF. L. REv. 583 (1930).
1613 N.Y. 378 (1856), where the court applied substantive due process to invalidate
the state prohibition law.
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Scott v. Sandford11 were to give due process a substantive content,
the antagonists in the slavery controversy had seized upon the clause
in the Fifth Amendment and endowed it with a substantive meaning to suit their respective propaganda purposes.
In 1836, the so-called Pinckney Report in the House of Representatives set forth the contention that due process acted as a substantive limitation upon the power of Congress to interfere with
property in slaves in the District of Columbia.18 Here was a substantive reading of the Fifth Amendment coupling it to the doctrine
of vested rights which directly anticipated Taney's· similar resort
to the clause in his Dred Scott opinion nearly a generation later.
Meanwhile, the enemies of slavery were engaged in formulating
their doctrines of a substantive due process. In 1836 the Ohio
abolitionist faction led by Theodore Dwight Weld and James G.
Birney launched an attack upon the state's so-called Black Laws of
1807.19 These statutes virtually prohibited Negro migration into
the state,. banned Negroes from certain occupations, denied them
the right to "be sworn or give evidence" in cases in which whites
were parties, and excluded colored and mulatto children from the
common schools. A report adopted at the Ohio Anti-Slavery Convention of 1835 first appealed to the familiar language and philosophy of the Declaration that "ALL men are born free and independent, and have certain natural inherent unalienable rights, among
which are the enjoying and defending of life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and attaining
happiness. ..,"20 and then blasted the obnoxious code as a violation of the due process clause of the state constitution.21
Thereafter, resort to due process as a guarantee incompatible
with the institution of slavery or a hierarchical caste society was a
common stock-in-trade of the antislavery radicals.22 The argument
that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment rightfully made
slavery unlawful in all the western territories appeared in the Free
Soil Party platforms of 1848 and 1852, and in the Republican Party
platforms of 1856 and 1860.23 And when Bingham took up the
19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
Rep. 691, 24th Cong., 1st sess. (1836).
19 5 Ohio Laws, c. 8, p. 53 (1807).
20 Proceedings of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Convention held at Putnam, 37 (1835).
21 Id. at 37-40.
22 Graham, "Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860,"
40 CAuF. L. REv. 483 (1953).
23 The Free Soil Party Platfonns are reprinted in 1 STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE
17

18 H.

1054

M1cHIGAN

LAw REvrnw

[ Vol. 54

cudgels in Congress as an enemy of slavery it was to the due process
clause that he turned for support in his attack on slavery in the
territories and for specific justification for the doctrine of equal
protection of the laws as inherent in the Federal Constitution.24
It is clear enough, then, that the pre-war antislavery radicals
fixed the immediate content of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was they who promoted the idea of a primary
national citizenship which included Negroes, and who attempted
to clothe such citizenship with privilege and immunities, due process, and equal protection, whereby they sought to establish complete equality before the law for whites and Negroes alike. · As of
1860, these doctrines were outside the pale of constitutional orthodoxy, but the political upheaval incident to the Civil War put a
group of old antislavery enthusiasts in a position to control the
Thirty-Ninth Congress and to write their radical reformism into
the Constitution itself. The debates on the passage of the amendment reveal clearly enough how completely the constitutional
ideology of the pre-war antislavery movement shaped the objectives
of the Radical Republicans. There is nothing very surprising in
all this, for the principal authors of the amendment as well as
numbers of other Radicals had themselves been associated with the
pre-war antislavery movement. John A. Bingham, principal
author of the first section of the amendment, had been a leading
congressional antislavery constitutional theorist.
However, a critical question remains: did the pre-war antislavery idealists conceive of equality before the law as enjoining
FROM 1788 to 1897, 239-241 and 253-256 (1928). The 1848 platform observed
that "our fathers •.• expressly denied to the federal government ••• all constitutional
power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due legal process" and
concluded as a consequence, "In the judgment of this convention, Congress has no more
power to make a slave than to make a king" and "it is the duty of the federal government to relieve itself from all responsibility for the existence or continuance of slavery
wherever the government possesses constitutional authority to legislate on that subject...•"
The 1852 platform was substantially identical. The Republican platform of 1856 declared
that "as our republican fathers ••• ordained that no person should be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, it becomes our duty to maintain this
provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing slavery in any territory of the United States.••." Again, the 1860 plank was substantially the same. Id. at 271, 291.
PRESIDENCY

24 In his January 1857 speech, Bingham argued that the due process clause in the
Fifth Amendment required Congress to enforce the "republican principle of absolute
equality," in the western territories, and that under the due process clause Congress could
permit "neither slave statutes nor slave constitutions" in the western territories. CONG,
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., 140 (1857). See also Bingham's speech incorporating the same
argument in CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d sess., 981-985 (1859).
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all class legislation based upon race? If so, the way is opened for
some plausibility for the argument that they carried this notion into the post-war era and that some of them saw it as implicit in the
language of the amendment they drafted.
The answer is that the constitutional opponents of slavery were
for the most part heavily preoccupied with the overwhelming curse
of slavery itself, but that on occasion they did indeed extend their
attack to all legalized class distinctions based upon race. The
Weld-Birney attack upon the Ohio "Black Laws," with their school
segregation provisions, has already been observed.25 Animosity to
racial segregation laws long remained a cardinal doctrine of Ohio
enemies of slavery. In 1847, ,for example, an antislavery convention at Macedon resolved that "all monopolies, class legislation, and
exclusive privileges are unequal, unjust, morally wrong, and subversive of the ends of civil government."26
In Massachusetts, the abolitionists staged a long and successful
legislative and judicial assault upon all class legislation by race.
In 1843, they secured repeal of the state miscegenation statute,
and they next won passage of a statute prohibiting "Jim Crow"
cars.27 They followed these victories with a concerted attack upon
segregated schools, which existed on a local option basis without
benefit of specific state sanction in Boston and a number of smaller
towns. Salem, Lowell, New Bedford and Nantucket presently
abolished segregated schools under abolitionist pressure. 28
In 1846, Wendell Phillips and his abolitionist fellows launched
a bitter assault upon the long established segregated Negro primary
school in Boston. However, the conservative majority on the
Boston School Committee refused their petition, defending segregated schools not only as "legal and just but best adapted to promote the education of that class of our population," a position
which The Liberator denounced as based on "flimsy yet venomous
sophistries." 29 When three years of public pressure failed, the antislavery enthusiasts in 1849 attacked the constitutionality of Boston
school segregation in the courts, retaining Charles Sumner as
Notes 19, 20, 21 supra.
Macedon Convention, Platform (1847). The platform also declared that "no civil
government can either authorize or permit one individual or class of men to infringe the
natural and equal rights of another individual or class of men...•"
27 MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 5-7 (1844).
28 Levy and Phillips, "The Roberts Case: Source of the 'Separate but Equal' Doctrine,"
56 AM. HIST. REv. 510 (1951).
29 THE LIBERATOR, August 21, 1846.
25

26
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counsel to argue their case before the Massachusetts Supreme
· Court.80
Sumner's argument in the resulting Roberts case stands even
today as the classic argument for the incompatibility of "equal
protection of the laws" and state-sanctioned caste institutions.
Asserting that his animating principle of equal protection was
derived properly from the language of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declaring that "all men are born free and equal,"31
he asserted that segregated schools violated equal protection and
the state constitution by imposing inconvenience upon Negro
children and "by establishing a system of Caste [as] odious as that
of the Hindoos." Cleverly anticipating a "separate but equal"
dictum from the court, he argued that "the separate school is not
an equivalent" for mixed schools, since it "brand[ s] a whole race
with the stigma of infei:iority and degredation" in violation of "the
equality of all men before the law."82 Sumner lost his case, and
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion today is remembered principally as
the source pf the separate but equal doctrine. 33 But the case remains powerful evidence of the fact that certain radical antislavery
idealists regarded legalized segregation as incompatible with constitutional government and equal protection.
The Roberts case does not stand alone; on the contrary, there
are numerous indications in the courts of the northern states between 1840 and 1860 that antislavery idealists were backing judicial
assault upon segregated schools. In Van Camp v. Board of Education,84 for example, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected an abolitionist attempt to break down a literal interpretation of the state school
segregation statute of 1853, which specifically required separate
white and Negro schools. The majority justices would not listen
to the argument, holding that the law's intent was clear and unao Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850).
81MAss. CoNsr., art. I, Part First (1780).
82 Sumner's complete argument is reprinted in .3 CHARLES SUMNER: His CoMPLETE
WORKS 51-100 (1900).
83 Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (59 Mass.) 198 (1850).
84 9 Ohio 407 (1859). The Van Camp case was the latest of a long series of school
segregation cases in Ohio before the Civil War. The Ohio Supreme Court for a long time
followed a "pro-Negro" interpretation of the law, allowing suits to admit mulatto children
to the public schools. Williams v. School District, Wright (Ohio) 578 (1834), and
Lane v. Baker, 12 Ohio 237 (1843). In the Van Camp case, the court admitted that earlier
decisions had in effect admitted colored children to the public schools, but held that the
1853 law had been enacted specifically to remedy judicial evasion of the earlier statutes.
In 1859, there was a hot political fight in San Francisco over the admission of Negroes
to the public schools. See Al>THEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HlsrORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN
THE UNITED STATFS 416-418 (1951).
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mistakable and that it was not unconstitutional, in that it was "one
of classification and not exclusion." But Justice Sutliff, dissenting,
attacked the majority decision as a violation of the rights of man
and proclaimed instead that ". . . caste legislation . . . is inconsistent with the theory and spirit of a free . . . government. " 35
Another question now presents itself: did the post-war authors
of the Fourteenth Amendment, who drew their constitutional doctrine from the old antislavery movement, also conceive of their
constitutional ideas as reflecting the pre-war antislavery animus
against caste and class legislation?
Any attempt to answer this question must begin with an analysis
of the debates on the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.36
For it was in those debates that the Radical ideas as to how far
federal guarantees of civil rights as against state action might properly extend, both by legislation and by constitutional amendment,
were first clearly set down. The debates on the Civil Rights Act
are also important because they reveal very clearly a direct linkage
between the ideas of the Radical Republican majority in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, and because the Civil Rights Act bore an
extremely close relationship to the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself.
A major consideration in the confused situation facing the
Thirty-Ninth Congress in December 1865 was the constitutional
and legal status of the Negro. The Radical Republican bloc
which was presently to take control of Congress and the process
of Reconstruction itself was not yet coherent or strong enough
to assert itself entirely; instead, for the moment the Radicals merely
blocked the seating of delegates from the Johnson governments
in the South, and ·then set up the Joint Committee of Fifteen,
composed of nine representatives and six senators, to study the
entire question of reconstruction and the Negro.37 It was this
committee which after several months of labor was to report the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the floor of Congress. Significantly, the Joint Committee was firmly under the control of
the Republican Radicals, several of whom, including John A.
Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens, had been prominently associated
with the radical pre-war antislavery movement.88
85 Van Camp v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio 407 at 416 (1859).
8614 Stat. L. 27 (1866).
37 CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess. 3-24 (1866). [This volume of the Globe is hereinafter cited as "Globe."]
38 KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMIIII"ITEE OF FIFTEEN ON REcoNSTRUGnON
37.ff. (1914). Committee members included Representatives Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsyl-
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However, the Radicals were not willing to await the committee
report before moving to protect the Negro. In particular, they
were vastly alarmed by the so-called "Black Codes" then being
enacted by the Johnson government legislatures. From a technical point of view, the Black Codes implied that the newly emancipated Negro occupied the status of an inferior non-citizen class,
a sort of modern helot, with legal rights vastly inferior to those of
the white mari.39 Significantly, several of the codes incorporated
segregation provisions.4.0 The Radicals soon made it clear in debate
that they were determined to destroy the ·Black Codes and to guarantee the Negro instead full citizenship and a concomitant body
of civil rights.
The difficulty was that the exact constitutional status of the
Negro was a matter of great uncertainty. It was not at all clear
whether any such thing as national citizenship existed; if it did
exist, it was not clear whether Negroes were or could be citizens of
the United States. Many of the more Radical Republicans, Charles
Sumner among them, still maintained the old antislavery faith:
that national citizenship existed by virtue of the old Constitution
and that Negroes were citizens of the United States clothed with a
vania, Co-chairman, Elihu Washbume of Illinois, Justin Morrill of Vermont, Henry Grider
of Kentucky, Roscoe Conkling of New York, John A. Bingham of Ohio, George Boutwell
of Massachusetts, Henry T. Blow of Missouri, and Andrew J. Rogers of New Jersey. Senate
members were William P. Fessenden of Maine, Co-Chairman, James W. Grimes of Iowa,
Ira Harris of New York, Jacob Howard of Michigan, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and
George H. Williams of Oregon. All but Grider, Rogers and Johnson were Republicans;
Stevens, Bingham, Conkling, Blow, and Morrill, were old Free Soil Whigs, as were Fessenden and Howard, while Williams, a former Democrat, was now an extreme Radical
Republican. Stevens and Bingham, more than the others the actual authors of the forthcoming amendment, had been prominent in the pre-war radi?11 antislavery movement.
89 Several of the codes are abstracted in Senate Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 170-230
(1866); others are in l FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HlsTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 273-312,
(1906). Most of the codes contained labor contract provisions similar to those later outlawed by the Supreme Court as peonage agreements in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
40 The Alabama and Mississippi codes prohibited miscegenation; Arkansas banned
Negroes from the public schools, "except such schools as may be established exclusively for
colored persons;" the Florida law set up a separately managed and separately taxed school
system for Negroes; the Texas Constitution of 1866 carried a similar provision; the Mississippi statutes forbade Negroes to ride in any car set aside for white persons, and prohibited "unlawful assembly" of whites and Negroes.
Carl Schurz' report to President Johnson and Charles Sumner on conditions in the
South strengthened the Radical conviction that the Black Codes were intended to thrust
servile status upon the Negro. Senate Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st sess. (1865); also 1 BANCROFT, ed., SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL ScHtJRZ 279-374 (1913).
Schurz mentioned the hostility in the South to Negro education and to Negro schools, and
remarked among other things that "the free colored element of Louisiana ... pays a not
inconsiderable proportion of the taxes, and contributes at the same time for the support
of schools for whites, from which their children are excluded."
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full body of civil rights. They insisted, indeed, that the Thirteenth
Amendment was merely "declaratory" in that both freedom and
citizenship were already inherent in the old Constitution.41 Others,
among them Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, thought the amendment had made Negroes citizens
and endowed them with full constitutional rights.42 Still others
were even more cautious; they admitted that emancipation did
not necessarily make the Negro a citizen, but they argued that the
amendment had paved the way for Congress to exercise its power
under the naturalization clause in Article I, section 8, and so bestow full citizenship upon the Negro.
The more Radical Republicans also believed that al.I persons,
white and Negro, were already clothed with a full body of civil
rights as a necessary incident of national citizenship. This was the
significance of the repeated references in debate on the Civil Rights
bill to Justice Washington's opinion in the Garfield case,43 where
the rights incident to citizenship had been described in all-inclusive
terms under the comity clause. It followed, they argued, that Congress already possessed comprehensive power to guarantee all civil
rights whatsoever. More moderate Republicans, however, believed that Congress constitutionally could guarantee only those
rights which were properly incident of the freedom guaranteed by
the Thirteenth Amendment, and that a further amendment would
be necessary to enable Congress to put all civil rights under federal
guarantee. After some initial confusion, this was to be the position
assumed both by Lyman Trumbull, author of the measure which
became the Civil Rights Act of 186644 and by John A. Bingham,
principal author of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Needless to say, nearly all Democrats and a few conservative
Republicans looked upon these ideas as anathema. They conceded
the Negro's freedom by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment, but
they denied that the Negro could be a citizen, distinguishing
sharply between full citizenship and the status of a mere inhabitant
without full membership in the body politic. Moreover, they
41 Sumner had argued during debates on the amendment that slavery was so repugnant
to the Constitution that Congress could destroy it by a simple statute. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st sess., 1479ff. (1864). James Ashley of Ohio in January 1865 argued that both
whites and Negroes, free and slave, already had citizenship by virtue of the comity clause.
Id. at 1199ff. Senator Ben Wade of Ohio took the same position. Id. at 2768.
42 Stevens, contrary to Sumner and Ashley, argued that the Thirteenth Amendment had
had a revolutionary effect on the constitutional system, and was not merely declaratory.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d sess., 265-266 (1865).
43 Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230.
4414 Stat. L. 27 (1866).

1060

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

denied the very doctrine of national citizenship itself, in spite of
the dictum of the Dred Scott case; 45 as a corollary, they denied also
that the Congress could legislate to make citizens, either by virtue
of the original Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment or the
naturalization clause, foreign immigrants excepted. For them the
Negro was still an inferior non-citizen whose rights were a matter
of the sovereign discretion of the several states. Indeed, all civil
rights lay within the reserved powers of the states, and Congress
was without power to legislate for the protection of civil rights,
either for whites or Negroes.
The introduction of a number of civil rights bills by the
Radicals soon brought divergent theories into sharp conflict.
These measures marked out in bold relief the determination of the
more enthusiastic Radicals to strike at the legal foundations of the
entire caste system in the South, and indeed to work something of
a revolution in the southern social order. With one important
exception, all died early deaths and so were not subject to extended
analysis in debate, so that it is not possible to state with any accuracy
what their precise legal effect with respect to racial class legislation
and segregation was intended to be, or what Congress would have
thought of the matter had they been so analyzed. Indeed, their
authors probably scarcely knew themselves, for at this stage the
legal impact of a federal civil rights statute upon state racial class
legislation simply had not been thought through carefully.
Yet it is significant that all the bills introduced resorted to
sweeping and all-inclusive prohibitory language and not mere
enumeration alone. 46 The mood of the Radicals was not one of
45Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
46 Worthy of some notice are Senate Bill 9, GLOBE 39, a temporary war measure intro•
duced by Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, and the civil rights sections in Senate
Bill 60, GLOBE 318, to extend the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, introduced by Senator
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. Wilson's bill, which was intended as a war measure applying
only to the seceded states would have declared null and void all laws in those states which
recognized "any inequality of civil rights and immunities" based on any distinction of
race, color or previous cond!tion of servitude. Speaking in defense of his measure, Wilson
said that "we must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution .•. is a free•
man indeed • • • that he can sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own
property, real and personal; that he go into the schools and educate himself and his chil•
dren; that the rights . • • of the good old common law are his, and that he walks the
earth •.. protected by the just and equal laws of his country." GLOBE Ill. Sumner in
praising Wilson's bill, compared its probable effect to the Czar's proclamation of 1861
ending serfdom in Russia, which among other things, he said, had guaranteed "equality ·at
schools and in education." He added, "I trust that this example is none the less worthy
of imitation because it is that of an empire.•••" GLOBE 91. Sumner's opposition to segre•
gated schools was of course far more clear and decisive than that of his other colleagues.
Trumbull's bill to extend the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau guaranteed Negroes
"all civil rights and immunities belonging to white persons," and "the full and equal benefit
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caution and restraint; on the contrary it was "revolutionary" in the
sense that they were not afraid to project changes in the southern
social order going far beyond the mere destruction of slavery.
Moreover, they were concerned remarkably little with the purely
traditional conservative constitutional notions of the extent of
federal power. This general "revolutionary" mood has long been
recognized by historians. 47 It is important to understand it, for
both the Civil Rights Act of 186648 and the Fourteenth Amendment were products of it.
By far the most important civil rights bill introduced was Senate
Bill 61, which Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, reported to the floor of the upper
house on January 5, 1866.49 This measure, destined to become the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,50 in its most important sections as amended provided:
"All persons born in the United States, and not subject to
any foreign Power, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States, without distinction of color, and there shall be
no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on
account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but
the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real ap.d personal property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate." Section 6 of the bill
empowered the bureau to acquire land for schools, although there was no suggestion that
this was to involve mixed schools. The Freedmen's Bureau was already operating nearly
a thousand Negro schools in the South, but it made no effort to make these mixed schools,
although many enthusiastic northerners hoped that this would be the result. COULTER,
THE SOU11I DURING REcoNSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 80-88 (1947); PEIRCE, THE FREEDMEN'S
BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 83 (1904).
47 See, for example, BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR 51 ff. (1930); RANDALL, THE Civn. WAR
AND REcoNSTRUCTION 718-730 (1937). Wendell Phillips in 1865 led a successful movement
to prevent dissolution of the American Antislavery Society, on the ground that the mere
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment would give "no assurance of full civil rights or
equality" for the Negro. The Society, he insisted, must continue until racial lines were
entirely obliterated. NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 186-187 (1955).
4814 Stat. L. 27 (1866).
49 GLOBE 129.
15014 Stat. L. 27 (1866).
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· other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to
the contrary notwithstanding."51
As originally introduced, the measure did not specifically guarantee citizenship, apparently because Trumbull took it for granted
that Negroes were now citizens of the United States, but very
shortly it was amended at Trumbull's instance to include the
citizenship clause, apparently because not all the Radicals were
certain that Negro citizenship was now self-evident.62
In opening debate on his bill on January 29, Trumbull argued
that the Thirteenth l~..mendment had made it both necessary and
constitutional. National citizenship, he thought, existed by virtue of the naturalization clause-here he agreed with Taney's
Dred Scott5 3 opinion. The Thirteenth Amendment had endowed
the Negro with citizenship as a necessary incident of freedom, and
Congress now had both the power and duty to guarantee the
rights incidental thereto. "[T]hey are entitled . . .," he said,
". . . to the great fundamental rights belonging to free citizens,
and we have a right to protect them in the enjoyment of them." 64
Trumbull then passed to an attack on the Black Codes, which,
he asserted, "although they do not make a man an absolute slave,
yet deprive him of the rights of a free man." The object of the
present bill, he continued, was ". . . to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the constitutional amendment."65
Trumbull made it clear that his notion of the rights incidental
to national citizenship was exceedingly comprehensive in character and followed closely pre-war antislavery constitutional doctrine.
"Then, sir, I take· it," he said, "that any statute which is not
equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of the civil rights
which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust . . . badge of
servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited."56 Citing the
dictum of Garfield v. Coryell,57 he argued that the rights of national
citizenship inclucled all "privileges and immunities which are in
61 Id. at 474, 498.
62 Id. at 474, 497, 498.
53 Dred Scott v. Sandford,
54 GLOBE 475. There was

,
19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
evidently some inconsistency in Trumbull's position. In response to a question by Senator Van Winkle of West Virginia, he asserted that Congress
possessed complete discretionary power over citizenship for Negroes by virtue of the naturalization clause, which implied that it might withhold citizenship from Negroes at its
discretion. But he next insisted that Negroes already were full citizens by virtue of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Ibid.
65 GLOBE 474.
66 Ibid.
57 (C.C. Pa. 1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230.
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their nature fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens of
all free Governments. . . ." 58 In short, he nationalized the comity
clause and turned it into a national bill of rights against the states,
as the pre-war antislavery theorists had pretty generally done.
The spirited debate that followed centered upon three highly
controversial constitutional questions: first, whether national
citizenship existed and whether Congress could constitutionally
confer such citizenship upon anyone, particularly upon Negroes;
second, whether Congress constitutionally could define and
guarantee the civil rights of so-called national citizens; and third,
. and most significant here, the scope of the civil rights which would
be guaranteed by the present bill.
Briefly, the Conservatives, led by Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, Garrett Davis of Kentucky,
Thomas Hendricks of Indiana, Peter Van Winkle of West Virginia, and Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, denied that national
citizenship existed, denied that Congress could define or confer
citizenship under the naturalization clause, denied that the
Thirteenth Amendment had made the Negro either a national or
a state citizen, denied that the amendment had endowed the Negro
with any rights other than simple freedom, and insisted that any
guarantee of civil rights was still entirely a matter of the sovereign
discretion of the several states. The Radicals, led by Trumbull
of Illinois, Lot Morrill and W. P. Fessenden of Maine, Henry
Wilson of Massachusetts, Timothy Howe of Wisconsin and Jacob
Howard of Michigan, insisted that national citizenship existed,
that Congress could define and confer it, that the Negro was already a citizen, and that Congress could legitimately protect civil
rights incident thereto.
More significant here was the sharp controversy that developed
over the question of the scope and inclusiveness of the guarantee of
civil rights in the proposed bill. The Conservatives seized at once
upon a broad and all-inclusive interpretation of the term "civil
rights," which they insisted also was implicit in the language of
the bill itself. They pointed to the clause stipulating that "there
shall be no discrimination in civil rights and immunities . . . on
account of race," 59 and argued strenuously that this provision
would destroy all state statutes whatsoever which made race the
basis of any kind of discrimination or classification. The con118 GLOBE
119 GLOBE

475, quoted Corfield v. Coryell, (C.C.
129.

Pa.

1823) 6 Fed. Cas. 546.
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sequence would be, they insisted, that state laws forbidding racial
intermarriage and providing for segregated schools, theatres, omnibusses, and the like would be struck down, a result they regarded
as monstrous. Senator Cowan, a conservative Republican, in particular, struck at the probable effect of the law on school segregation:
"Now, as I understand the meaning and intent of this bill,
it is that there shall be no discrimination made between the
inhabitants of the several states of this Union, none in any
way. In Pennsylvania, for the greater convenience of the
people, and for the greater convenience, I may say, of both
classes of the people, in certain districts the Legislature has
provided schools for colored children, has discriminated as
between the two classes of children. We put the African
children in this school-house and the white children over in
that school-house, and educate them there as we best can. Is
this amendment to the Constitution of the United States
abolishing slavery to break up that system which Pennsylvania
has adopted for the education of her white and colored chil- dren? Are the school directors who carry out that law and
who make this distinction between these classes of children to
be punished for a violation of this statute of the United States?
To me, it is monstrous." 60
Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, one of the best legal minds in the
Senate, pointed out that a number of the states had laws prohibiting marriage between the races; the "no discrimination" clause,
he said, would make miscegenation clauses unconstitutional
whether or not this was Trumbull's intent. Not at all, said Trumbull and Fessenden; the bill would leave the two races under the
same prohibition against marrying outside their own race; therefore it did not discriminate. But Johnson refused to accept this
plea and continued to insist that under the proposed law state miscegenation statutes would be void.61 Garrett Davis of Kentucky
observed that the criminal code of his own state drew a distinction
between Negroes and whites in the punishment for rape of a
white woman-for the former the punishment was death; for the
latter a term of imprisonment. And he concluded: "Here the
honorable senator in one short bill breaks down all the domestic
60 Id.
61 Id.

at 500.
at 505-507.
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systems of law that prevail in all the States . . . except so far as
those laws shall be entirely uniform in their application." 62
There were two possible answers to the Conservatives' interpretation of the sweeping extent of the "no discrimination" clause.
One was to admit the point and concede freely the revolutionary
force of the bill, and some of the Radicals were inclined to adopt
exactly this position. The reply tendered Davis by Senator Morrill
was characteristic of this position:
"The Senator from Kentucky tells us that the proposition
is revolutionary, and he thinks that is an objection. I freely
concede that it is revolutionary. I admit that this species of
legislation is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the
midst of revolution? Is the Senator from Kentucky utterly
oblivious to the grand results of four years of war? . . .
"I accept, then, what the Senator from Kentucky thinks so
obnoxious. We are in the midst of revolution." 63
Another answer consisted in offering vague assurances that the
bill would not violate states rights, without attempting to answer
specifically precise questions about the scope of the bill or its impact upon particular instances of racial class legislation. Thus,
Senator Howard, attempting to reassure moderate Republicans
showing some concern, observed,
". . . I do not understand the bill which is now before us
to contemplate anything else than this, that in respect to all
civil rights . . . there is to be . . . no distinction between
the white race and the black race. It is to secure to these
men whom we have made free the ordinary rights of a freeman
and nothing else. . . ." There is no invasion of the legitimate
rights of the States." 64
The trouble with reassurance of this sort, however, was that it
simply did not meet the Conservative charge as to the scope of
civil rights involved. The Radicals doubtless realized this well
enough, which was one reason why they continued to deal in
generalities. It must be observed also, that the projected measure
was so novel and the term "civil rights" itself so devoid of antecedent legal history that a definition of very precise legal consequences was a difficult or impossible matter.
62

Id. at 598.
570.
504.

63 Id. at
64 Id. at
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The Senate on February 2 passed the Trumbull bill, 33 to 12,
with the "no discrimination" clau·se intact. 65 It was clear, however,
that the Conservatives' broad interpretation of this clause and of
the bill generally had raised many doubts which would have to
be resolved before the measure became law.
The Trumbull bill now went to the House, where on March
2 it was reported out on the floor by James Wilson of Iowa, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. Wilson's defense of the
bill's constitutionality was substantially the same as that of Trum-bull, but on the question of the force and effect of the "no discrimina~ion" clause he declared for a narrow interpretation of the measure in unequivocal terms:
"This part of the bill [he said, in reference to the no discrimination clause] will probably excite more opposition and
elicit more discussion than any other; and yet to my mind it
seems perfectly defensible. It provides for the equality of
citizens of the United States in the enjoyment of civil rights
and immunities. What do these terms mean? Do they mean
that in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without
distinction of race or color, shall be equal? . . . No. . . :
Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the same juries,
or that their children shall attend the same schools. These
are not civil rights or immunities." 66
He then went on to assert vaguely that civil rights were only the
"natural rights of man," while immunities, he said, merely secure
to citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the
law. 67
In other words, Wilson attempted to reassure the more moderate Republicans and Conservatives by adopting a restrictive interpretation of the "no discrimination" clause. But the Conservatives in the House also refused to be reassured. Representative
Rogers of New Jersey, a die-hard conservative Democrat and a
member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, replied to Wilson in
a lengthy speech in which he argued, as had Johnson, Hendricks,
and Davis in the Senate, that the "no discrimination" clause would
break down all state statutes which classified on the basis of race.
He cited once more the Kentucky statute for the unequal punishment of rape, the anti-miscegenation acts, an Indiana statute for65 Id. at
66 Id. at
67 Ibid.

606, 607.
1117.
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bidding Negroes to acquire real estate, and the Pennsylvania
statute segregating white and Negro school children. Civil rights,
he insisted, in fact included "all the rights that we enjoy." "What
broader words than privileges and immunities," he inquired, "are
to be found in the dictionary?" 68 Representative Delano, of Ohio,
another conservative, citing the old Ohio school segregation law,
observed that the statute "did not, of course, place the black population on an equal· footing with the whites, and would, therefore,
under the terms of this bill be void. " 69 Michael Kerr of Indiana,
challenging the constitutionality of the bill under the Thirteenth
Amendment, asked rhetorically whether it was slavery or involuntary servitude" . . . to deny to children of free negroes or mulattoes . . • the privilege of attending the common schools of a State
with the children of white men?" 70 Representative Henry Raymond, a moderate New York Republican and editor of the New
York Times, warned that in his understanding the term "civil
rights" covered the whole range of commonly understood liberties
and immunities, and that he therefore entertained grave doubts as
to the measure's constitutionality.71
These arguments carried the day. On March 9, John A. Bingham of Ohio, then a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which presently was to report the substance of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Congress, rose in the
House to demand that the "no discrimination" clause be struck
out of the bill. Accepting the "broad" or Conservative interpretation of the "no discrimination" clause, Bingham argued that civil
rights included the entire range of civil privileges and immunities
within organized society, excepting only political rights, and then
insisted that Congress had no power to enact such legislation merely
by benefit of the constitutional powers it derived from the Thirteenth Amendment. The result of the present language, Bingham
said, would be to strike down every state law that set up any kind
of discrimination against Negroes:
"If civil rights has this extent, what, then, is proposed by
the provision of the first section? Simply to strike down by
congressional enactment every State constitution which makes
a discrimination on account of race or color in any of the civil
rights of the citizen. I might say here, without the least fear
68 Id. at 1122."
69 Id., appendix
70 Id. at 1268.
71 Id. at 1267.

at 158.
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of contradicti~n, that there is scarcely a State in this Union
which does not, by its constitution or its statute laws, make
some discrimination on account of race or color between
citizens of the United States in respect of civil rights." 72
Bingham then insisted that he believed that all discriminatory
legislation ought to be wiped out. But the proper way to achieve
this result, he thought, was "not by an arbitrary assumption of
power, but by amending the Constitution of the United States,
expressly prohibiting the States from any such abuse of power in
the future. " 73
Wilson at first refused to accept Bingham's "broad interpretations," and tried to defend the language of the Trumbull bill as it
stood:
"The gentleman from Ohio tells the House that civil
rights involve all the rights that citizens have under the
72 Id. at 1291. Bingham had offered a motion the previous day to recommit the bill
with instructions to strike out the "no discrimination" clause. Id. at 1266.
73 Id. at 1291. The precise character of Bingham's argument has become a matter of
some controversy. Bickel, in "The Original Understanding and Segregation Decision," 69
HAR.v. L. REV. I (1955), argues that Bingham objected to the "no discrimination" clause
as a matter of policy as well as a matter of constitutional law and that he was "endeavoring merely to make the bill 'less offensive, less unjust.'" He does not think that Bingham
implied that he would approve the "no discrimination" clause were the constitutional
difficulty removed. He points out that Bingham's words, "I say with all my heart, that
this should be the law of every State,'' and advocating a constitutional amendment instead of "an arbitrary assumption of power" by Congress were spoken immediately after
Bingham had quoted the enumerated guarantees of the bill, not the "no discrimination"
clause. Thus he concludes that Bingham did not mean to lend ariy support in policy, even
by constitutional amendment, for the "no discrimination" clause.
To the present writer this seems a very doubtful reading of Bingham's position. It
ignores his extensive extremist antislavery background as well as his position in Congress
as one of the strong Radical Republicans; it ignores, also, the latitudinarian defense of
the force and scope of his own constitutional amendment with respect to civil rights which
Bingham had presented to the House a few days earlier. It ignores also the following words
of Bingham later in the same speech: "Now what does this bill propose? To reform the
whole civil and criminal code of every State government by declaring that there shall be
no discrimination between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in the
penalties prescribed by their laws. I humbly bow before the majesty of justice, as I bow
before the majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and therefore declare there should
be no such inequality or discrimination even in the penalties for crime; but what power
have you to correct it? That is the question . • . whence do you derive power to cure it
by congressional enactment?" GLOBE 1293. It appears probable that while Bingham entertained grave doubts as to the bill's constitutionality, he had no objection to the discrimination clause as a matter of policy, and on the contrary he looked forward to curing
the constitutional difficulty by amendment. Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding
of 'Equal Protection of the Laws,' " 50 CoL. L. REv. 131 (1950) agrees with this conclusion,
as do Graham, "Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment,'' 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954), and
FLACK, THE .ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 35 (1908). The vital objection to
Bickel's interpretation, which, if valid, destroys the argument that Bingham ever sought
anything more than a restricted scope of civil rights for the Negro, is that it is contradicted
by Bingham's entire career and by his latitudinarian position during the debates on the
Fourteenth Amendment.
'
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government; that in the term are embraced those rights which
belong to a citizen of the United States as such: . . . and
that this bill is not intended merely to enforce equality of
rights, so far as they relate to citizens of the United States,
but invades the States to enforce equality of rights in respect
to those things which properly and rightfully depend on State
regulations and laws. . . . He knows, as every man knows,
that this bill refers to those rights which belong to men as
citizens of the United States and none other; and when he talks
of setting aside the school laws and jury laws and franchise
laws of the States by the bill now under consideration, he steps
beyond what he must know to be the rule of construction
which must apply here, and as the result of which this bill
can only relate to matters within the control of Congress." 74
Here was a restrictive interpretation which actually anticipated
the dual citizenship doctrine of the "privileges and immunities"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughterhouse
cases.75 And here again was a denial that the "no discrimination"
clause would strike down state racial statutes classifying by race.
After some maneuvering, Bingham carried the day. His amendment to strike out the "no discrimination" clause was first voted
down 113 to 37, but the bill was nonetheless returned to the
Judiciary Committee for restudy. 76 On March 13, Wilson himself,
reporting the bill to the floor once more, moved to strike out the
"no discrimination" clause on the grounds that the words in question "might give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended."77 The House immediately concurred unanimously and
without debate-obviously Bingham's argument had ceased to be
a matter of controversy. Immediately thereafter, the House passed
the bill, 111 to 38.78 The Senate concurred in the Bingham amendment,79 and the bill went to the President, to become law over
Johnson's veto.
It seems highly probable, then, that the Civil Rights Act, as
finally passed, was not intended to ban state racial segregation and
classification laws. The main force of the Conservatives' attack
on the "no discrimination" clause was that it would indeed destroy
1294.
(83 U.S.) 36 (1873).
76 GLOBE 1296. The motion to recommit carried 82 to 72, with Bingham and a considerable number of the Republicam voting with the Democrats.
77 GLOBE 1366.
78 Id. at 1367.
79 Id. at 1416.
74 GLOBE

75 16 Wall.
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all race classification laws. The supporters of the bill at first insisted that this interpretation was erroneous, but when John A.
Bingham dramatically defended the Conservative interpretation in
the face of James Wilson's declaration of narrow intent, the House
finally resolved the element of doubt by striking out the "no discrimination" clause entirely.
It must be observed, however, that some element of doubt
remained as to the scope of the bill, even at the time. Several
Conservatives, among them Rogers, Cowan, Davis and Grim.es,
even in the hour of final passage, continued to insist that the bill
would destroy all racial segregation laws. The phrase "the inhabitants of every race . . . shall have the same right . . . to . . . full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property"80 still stood in the bill, and was susceptible
of possible broad interpretation, although it had not been stressed
during the debates on the measure. Garrett Davis, for example,
in a speech following Johnson's veto, cited various state laws imposing segregation in churches, omnibusses, steamboats, railroads,
and the ·like, and asserted, "All these discriminations in the entire
society of the United States are established by ordinances, regulations, and customs. This bill proposes to break down and sweep
them away, and to consummate their destruction, and bring the
two races upon the same great plane of perfect equality. . . .~'81
Numerous newspapers in both the North and South also
thought that the bill would destroy entirely segregation in schools,
theatres, churches, and public vehicles.82 A number of suits were
filed in the state and district federal courts in the next year or so
attacking local segregation laws banning Negroes from omnibusses,
theatres, and churches.83 However, President Johnson in his veto
message did not adopt the broad interpretation of the bill. Assuming instead that it protected merely those rights inherent in citizenship and freedom, he argued merely that if Congress could constitutionally go this far in the protection of civil rights, there was
80 Id. at 474, 498.
81 Id., appendix at 183.
82 NEW YoRK HERALD,

March 29, 1866; Id., April 10, 1866; CINCINNATl CoMMERCIAL,
March 30, 1866; NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, April 16, 1866; Id., May 16, 1866.
83 FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 49-54 (1908) gives a summary
of cases. In United States v. Rhodes, (C.C. Ky. 1866) 27 Fed. Cas. 785, No. 16, 151, Justice
Swayne held the Civil Rights Act constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, but
observed that the law also "gives only certain civil rights." Id. at 794•. The case dealt with
the right of a Negro to testify against whites in the Kentucky courts, a right Swayne
affirmed under the Jaw.
·
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no logical reason why it could not make segregation and intermarriage a matter of congressional regulation.84
A new question now occurs: what was the relationship of the
Civil Rights Act to the Fourteenth Amendment itself? Was the
first section of the amendment intended merely to remove doubt
as to the constitutional status of the Civil Rights Act, or was it the
intent of the framers of the amendment and of Congress to go
beyond the restrictive and ~numerative scope of the Civil Rights
Act, and to place all civil rights, in the Bingham sense, under the
protection of the amendment?
The evidence on this critical point is somewhat contradictory,
but careful analysis appears to establish the following tentative
conclusions: First, the principal Radical leaders concerned with
the amendment, notably Bingham, Stevens, Morrill, Fessenden,
and Howard, deliberately sought to go far beyond the guarantees
of the Civil Rights Act and to place all civil rights, in the expansive
Bingham definition, under federal guarantees of equality against
state law. Second, for strategic political reasons, the first section
of the amendment was in part, at least, represented on the floor
of both houses as intended merely to constitutionalize the Civil
Rights Act and to put its guarantees beyond assault by possible
future conservative Congresses. Third, and perhaps most important, the very phrases used in the first section of the amendment
were, by virtue of their history and derivation, somewhat vague
and amorphous, and not subject to precise legal delineation in
debate, and it was not altogether to the Radical interest to attempt
such definition.
The intent of certain Radical leaders to go beyond the restrictive enumeration of the Civil Rights Act and to incorporate a
series of expansive guarantees in the Constitution is quite clear.
In a general sense, the best evidence of this is the language of the
guarantees which Bingham and the other authors of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated in the first section. The guarantees they finally adopted-privileges and immunities, due process and equal protection-were not at all derived from the Civil
Rights Act, which, with the exception of one vague phrase in its
final form, had used the restrictive enumerative device. Instead,
the authors derived their guarantees deliberately from the pre-war
Radical antislavery movement. If we recall Bingham's prominent
pre-war association with the formulation of these guarantees m
84 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

3065 (1913).
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antislavery ideology, we may conclude reasonably enough that
the resort to this language was no accident.
Now it cannot be emphasized too strongly that these phrases,
as used in the antislavery movement, had a radical expansive,
humanitarian, equalitarian quality. As already observed, the prewar antislavery idealists had endowed due process of law with a
substantive spirit (very different, indeed, from that which it had
acquired in the Dred Scott and Wynehamer cases) which in effect
made it a legislative injunction to maintain a casteless equalitarian
social order. So, likewise, "privileges and immunities," derived
from the comity clause of the old Constitution, had been seized
upon, given the expansive content of Justice Washington's all-inclusive description in the Garfield case, and translated into a
national Bill of Rights against state action. And as for equal
protection-it was straight-out antislavery equalitarian ideology
with virtually no antecedent legal history at all. In was these
phrases, with their expansive implications, which now went into
the amendment, and not the restrictive phraseology of the Civil
Rights Act. The Radicals were now amending the Constitution,
not writing a statute. The debates show that they were well aware
of the fact.
This first became evident in February, when Bingham, on the
instructions of the Joint Committee, introduced the following draft
of a constitutional amendmenfin the House (H. R. 63):
"The Congress shall have power to ·make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens qf each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States [Article IV, Section 2]; and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property [Fifth Amendment] ."85
Here was the old antislavery theory that the comity clause properly
constituted a national bill of rights, hitherto without direct federal
sanctions, which would now be supported with a grant of specific
congressional legislative power, and that at least the due process
clause of the federal Bill of Rights should be made a guarantee
against state action. This was what Bingham meant when he
85GLOBE 813. This proposal had been evolved after several days of discussion in the
Joint Committee, which had voted, 9 to 5, to report the amendment to the House. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITIEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914).
(See note 38 supra.) The proposal had its beginnings in resolutions introduced in the
House in December by Bingham and Stevens and referred to the Joint Committee. Id. at
14. The final form of the proposal was Bingham's.
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said, in explaining his amendment to the House, "Every word of
the proposed amendment is today in the Constitution of our country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon
the Congress of the United States."86
Bingham and Stevens presently made it clear that they intended
the amendment to place all civil rights under a federal guarantee
of equality against state action, a proposal going far beyond the
scope of the Civil Rights bill as presently amended. At the same
time they repelled emphatically the contention that the amendment
would effect a general transfer of the area of sovereignty over civil
rights from states to the national government. What they proposed was a congressional guarantee of equality with respect to
all state legislation, subject only to reasonable classification; subject to this guarantee, the states' right to legislate was to remain
unimpaired.
These points became clear when the amendment came up for
debate at the end of February. Representative Robert S. Hale of
New York, a respected Republican and competent lawyer, made
a carefully considered attack upon the proposal, insisting at some
length that its language was such that it would effect a total transfer of sovereignty over civil rights from the states to the federal
government. Thaddeus Stevens challenged this sharply at once,
insisting that the amendment would merely impose a very general
and inclusive guarantee of equality upon the states. In support
of his contention he drew an illustration of "reasonable classification" in state legislation to show how the states would retain jurisdiction subject to the federal guarantees.87
The following day Bingham also undertook to answer Hale.
Denying that the amendment would invade the powers of the states
other than with respect to the guarantee of equality, he insisted
that it was "a proposition to arm the Congress . . . to enforce
the bill of rights, as it stands in the Constitution . . . [and] no
more."88 Hale then asked Bingham "as an able constitutional
lawyer" whether in his opinion the amendment did not secure
to Congress a "general power of legislation" to protect civil rights.
Bingham immediately admitted, "I believe it does with respect to
86 GLOBE

87 Ibid.

1063-1064.

Stevens' argument was a direct anticipation of the "reasonable classification"
doctrines developed later under the Fourteenth Amendment.
88 Id. at 1088. The speech makes it clear that by "bill of rights" Bingham meant both
the guarantees of the comity clause and the guarantees of due process in the Fifth Amendment.
·
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life, liberty, and property as I have heretofore stated it." Not
satisfied, Hale put again the question of whether the amendment
would confer "general powers of legislation upon Congress."
Bingham replied: "It certainly does this: it confers upon Congress the power to see to it that the protection given by the laws
of the States shall be equal in respect to life and liberty and property to all persons." And when Hale asked where this "doctrine"
was to be found in the amendment, Bingham replied, "The words
'equal protection' contain it, and nothing else."89 In other words,
the amendment was to impose a very general requirement of
equality on all state legislation of the most inclusive kind; at the
same time it would not affect the capacity of the states to legislate
otherwise.90
It will be recalled that early in March, a few days after this
exchange with Hale, Bingham was to rise in the House to attack
the constitutionality of the "no discrimination" clause of the Civil
Rights bill, explaining emphatically that the term "civil rights"
properly included the entire range of natural, organic, and social
rights in organized society, that a federal guarantee of such rights
was altogether laudable but beyond the powers of Congress, and
that it ought properly to be sought by constitutional amendment.
This speech properly should be read together with Bingham's
defense of R.R. 63 as a revelation of his fundamental intentions. It
le~ves little doubt that his objective was to place all civil rights
under federal guarantee, but he believed strongly that this must
be accomplished by constitutional amendment.
Bingham's amendment was not acted upon; instead the House
by a vote of llO to 37 postponed further consideration until early
April.91 In this form the proposal was not heard from again. It
is sometimes assumed that the shelving of R.R. 63 meant that the
House had rejected the idea of congressional power to legislate in
support of a federal guarantee of equality. This conclusion, the
89 Id. at 1094.
90 Rogers' main

complaint was that Bingham's amendment, if adopted, would destroy
all state caste legislation entirely, including miscegenation acts, laws imposing special punishments for crime, and school segregation laws. The latter point he emphasized particularly, as follows: "In the state of Pennsylvania there are laws which make a distinction
with regard to the schooling of white children and the schooling of black children. It is
provided "that certain schools shall be designated and set apart for white children, and
certain other schools designated and set apart for black children. Under this amendment,
Congress would have. the power to compel the State to provide for white children and
black children to attend the same school, upon the principle that all the people in the
several States shall have equal protection in all the rights of life, liberty, and property,
and all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." GLOBE, appendix, 134.
91 GLOBE 1095.
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present writer believes, is incorrect. The members of the House
may well have concluded that Hale's argument-that the amendment would result in a general transfer of sovereign~y over all civil
rights from the states to the federal government-was correct, although Bingliam and Stevens had emphatically denied any such
purpose. However, this must not be confused with a rejection by
the House of the fundamental idea of congressional power to impose a guarantee of equality. On the contrary, several Radicals,
Gilbert Hotchkiss and Roscoe Conkling of New York among them,
expressed a very different objection to Bingham's amendment: it
did not, Hotchkiss pointed out, resulf in "permanently securing
those rights," but left them at the mercy of future congressional
discretion.92 The answer might be, Conkling suggested, a categorical guarantee of equality which Congress could implement but not
impair.93 In fact, this was to be the solution embodied in the
amendment reported out in late April, when once more, however,
the Radicals were to lay heavy emphasis in debate upon congressional legislative power.
For about six weeks after the shelving of Bingham's amendment, the.Joint Committee appears to have been inactive. However, on April 21, Stevens introduced to the committee a proposed
comprehensive amendment which contained a first section similar
to the "no discrimination" clause early struck out of the Civil
Rights Act as far too comprehensive for congressional power. In
other words, Stevens here sought to incorporate legal language
which it had already been generally agreed would have the effect
of destroying all class and caste legislation, including segregation
laws, a fairly decisive indication that Steven's notions as to the
comprehensive force that any amendment ought to have were in
the same class as Bingham's. Significantly, the "no discrimination"
guarantee in Steven's proposal was now mandatory, and not subject to congressional discretion, although a separate section (5)
now gave Congress comprehensive power to enforce the guarantees of the amendment.94
92 Id.
93 Id.

at 1094-1095.
at 1096. Bick.el, in "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,"
69 HARv. L. REv. I at.37-40 (1955), thinks Hale's argument prevailed with the House, while
Fairman, in "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?" 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 at 24ff. (1949), thinks Bingham was unable to defend clearly the possible legal implications of the amendment. Both propositions may well be true, although there is no
specific evidence available at all as to why the House failed to act later.
94 Section 5, which the committee obviously regarded as of great importance, read as
follows: "Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions

1076

MICHIGAN

LA.w

REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

After some uncertainty, the Joint Committee a week later replaced Steven's proposal with a new first section drafted al}d introduced by Bingham, modelled upon Bingham's February amendment, but incorporating certain critical changes:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws." 95
The new proposal incorporated essentially the same guarantees
as the February amendment-"privileges and immunities," "due
process," and "equal protection," but in certain technical respects
it differed vitally. Most important, it created rights which would
· be enforceable at law through the judicial process. The rights in
question would be beyond the power of Congress to impair or destroy by withholding legislative action, as would have been the
case with the February proposal.
.
More difficult of analysis is the contrast between the two provisions with respect to the capacity of Congress to legislate in the
area of civil rights generally. The language of the new section
made it clear that there was to be no transfer of plenary legislative
. sovereignty over civil rights to Congress but only a congressional
of this article." KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON R.EcoNSTRUCfION 83-84 (1914).
Section one of the proposed amendment provided: "No discrimination shall be made
by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." Ibid. Section 2 would have forbidden racial discrimination in political rights after July 4, 1876; section 3 would have excluded from the basis
of state representation persons denied the suffrage ·because of race before July 4, 1876;
section 4 invalidated the Confederate debts. Sections 2, 3, and 4 were subjected to extensive changes before and after the amendment reached the floor. Section 5 alone remained
unchanged as the amendment was finally adopted.
95This new first section, which with_ the addition of the citizenship clause was to win
adoption as the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, was the result of several complex changes in the Joint Committee which revealed great uncertainty on the members'
part as to precisely how it wished to accomplish its purpose. On April 21, Bingham· first
moved to add to Stevens' original section I the words: "Nor shall any state deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property
for public use without just compensation." The committee voted this down 6 to 5, with
only Johnson, Stevens, Bingham, Blow and Rogers supporting it. A few moments later,
however, Bingham introduced as a proposed new section 5, the provision guaranteeing
privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection, as set forth in the text above.
The committee first voted 10 to 2 to accept this proposal; however, four days later the
members, on Williams' motion, struck the section out, 7 to 5, and a proposal by Bingham
to submit the deleted section to Congress as a separate amendment also failed, 8 to 4.
But on April 28, Bingham moved to strike out section I (Stevens' "no discrimination" provision), and to substitute Bingham's section in its place, and the Committee finally did so,
10 to 3. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT CoMMITI'EE OF FIFrEEN ON R.EcoNSTRUCfION
82-107 (1914).
·
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power to enforce the guarantees in the amendment. This met
successfully the principal change which Hale and others had raised
in February against H.R. 63. However, this did not mean, as
was later asserted, that Congress was to be without power to enforce the guarantees in section one by appropriate legislation.
Both the journal of the Joint Committee and the debates make it
clear that section one was to be read in connection with section
five, so that Congress would have the power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.
Here still another possible legal distinction appears. The
February proposal would have given Congress the power in so many
words to enforce the rights of citizens; section one of the later
amendment created rights only as against state action. Did this
mean that the committee now recognized that Congress would not
be able to legislate to enforce equality as against individual in- ·
fringement, as it later attempted to do in the Civil Rights Act of
1875? No certain answer is probable; the distinction simply was
not drawn clearly in committee or debate at the time. All that
remains certain is that Bingham and the committee did not intend to withdraw congressional power to enforce the rights guaranteed in the amendment; instead it merely sought to withdraw from
legislative discretion any power to impair or diminish the rights
in question, a change Hotchkiss, Conkling, and other Radicals had
insisted upon as important.
When the new amendment reached the floor of Congress on
April 30,96 a curious ambiguity developed in the Radicals' advocacy
of the measure. On one hand, the Radical leaders, especially in
the House, presented the first section as primarily an attempt to
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act and so either to remove
doubts as to its validity or to place the guarantees of the act beyond
the assault of future hostile Congresses. At the same time, however, they met the Conservative charges as to the broad and revolutionary scope of the rights to be placed under federal protection
neither with affirmation nor denial; instead, Bingham, Stevens,
and their associates used the technique of lofty, expansive, and
highly generalized language to describe the amendment's potential
consequences. It was as though the Radical leaders were avoiding
a precise delineation of legal consequences.
96 GLOBE 2286. As reported, section I was exactly as Bingham had introduced it to
the Joint Committee. The citizenship clause presently to become the first sentence of section I was added later in the Senate, principally because of doubts about the constitutionality of the guarantee in the Civil Rights Act. GLOBE 2869.
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This ambiguity was present in Stevens' speech of May 8 opening debate on the amendment in the House. He first reiterated
the old antislavery theory that these guarantees were already in the
Declaration of Independence or the "organic law." "But the
Constitution," he went on, "limits only the action of Congress,
and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies
that defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation
of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all. . . . Whatever law protects the
white man shall afford 'equal' protection to the black man."97
It is worth observing here that Stevens is assuming a comprehensive congressional legislative power to enforce the amendment
against state law.
Stevens then went on to avow that a principal purpose of the
amendment was to place the remedies of the Civil Rights Act
beyond assault by future unfriendly Congresses:
"Some answer, 'Your Civil Rights Bill secures the same
things.' That is partly true, but a law is repealable by a
majority. And I need hardly say that the first time that the
South with their copperhead allies obtain the command of
Congress it will be repealed. . . . This amendment once
adopted cannot be amended without two-thirds of Congress.
That they will hardly get." 98
Subsequent speakers on both sides of the House fell in line with
this theory that the first section was in part at least declaratory
of the Civil Rights Act, and was intended either to remove doubts
as to the constitutionality of the law or to place its guarantees
beyond congressional discretion. Thus Democrat William Finck
of Ohio twitted the Radicals with the observation that "all I have
to say about this section is, that if it is necessary to adopt it . . .
then the civil rights bill, which the President vetoed, was passed
without authority, and is clearly unconstitutional." 99 The response of James A. Garfield of Ohio was characteristic of the
Radical position: "The civil rights bill is now a part of the law
of this land. But every gentleman knows it will cease to be a part
of the law whenever the sad moment arrives when that gentleman's
97 GLOBE 2459.
98 Ibid.
99 Id. at 2461.

Rep. Charles Eldridge of Wisconsin asked ironically, "What necessity
is there, then, for this amendment ••• if that bill was constitutional at the time of passage?" Id. at 2506.
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party comes into power. . . . For this reason, and not because I
believe the civil rights bill unconstitutional, I am glad to see that
first section here."100 And Henry J. Raymond of New York,
pointing out that he had voted against the Civil Rights Act because
of very grave doubts as to its constitutionality, assured the House
that he had at all times been "heartily in favor" of the law's objective of "securing an equality of rights for all citizens of the United
States;" accordingly, he said, he would "vote·very cheerfully" for
the present section.101
All this might well imply that the first section of the proposed
amendment was intended to be merely declaratory of the Civil
Rights Act, and would not go beyond its rather restrictive guarantees. But a second theme was present in the House debates-the
argument that the phraseology of the first section was expansive
and "revolutionary" in character, so that its precise future meaning
was susceptible to indefinitely broad interpretation. Benjamin
Boyer of Pennsylvania, speaking for the Democrats, warned that
section one ". . . is objectionable also in its phraseology, being
open to ambiguity and admitting of conflicting constructions."102
Democrat Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania went farther, and
asserted, "The first section proposes to make an equality in every
respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy of discrimination which has hitherto been exclusively exercised by the
States. . . ." 103 Rogers of New Jersey, now a "bete noire" of the
Radicals, charged that the term "privileges and immunities" was
so comprehensive as to work a general revolution in the constitutional system:
"What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the
rights we have under the laws of the country are embraced
under the definition of privileges and immunities. The right
to vote is a privilege. The right to marry is a privilege. The
right to contract is a privilege. The right to be a juror is a
privilege. The right to be a judge or President of the United
States is a privilege. I hold if that ever becomes a part of the
fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from
refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced under this
term of privileges and immunities. If a negro is refused the
right to be a juror, that will take away from his privileges and
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.

at
at
at
at

2462.
2502.
2461.
2530.
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immunities as a citizen of the United States, and the Federal
Government will step in and interfere. . ·. . It will result
in a revolution worse than that through which we have just
passed."104
It will be observed that Rogers was adopting precisely the theory
of "privileges and immunities" which Bingham had presented to
the House two months earlier. Obviously, also, it was not possible
for the Radicals to reply with any narrow construction doctrine,
unless they wished to destroy the expansive force of the first section. The only possible reassurance to moderates, therefore, was
the old antislavery argument that the guarantees in question were
already in the Constitution, although hitherto without federal
sanctions against the states, a position which if one recalls expansive doctrine of the Corfield case could hardly have reassured opponents of the amendment very greatly. It was in this vein that
Bingham undertook a reply to Rogers:
"The necessity for the first section of this amendment to
the Constitution, Mr. Speaker, is one of the lessons that have
been taught to your committee and taught to all the people
of this country by the history of the past four years of terrible
conflict-that history in which God is, and in which He
teaches the profoundest lessons to men and nations. There
was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in the
Constitution of our country, which the proposed amendment
will supply. What is that? It is the power in the people,
the whole people of the United States, by express authority of
the Constitution, to do that by congressional enactment which
hitherto they have not had the power to do, and have never
even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic
and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction
whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.
"Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it.
No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws ·
or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of
the Republic, although many of them have assumed and
exercised the power, and that without remedy. . .." 105
104 Id.
105 Id.

at 2538.
at 2542. A few minutes after Bingham spoke the House passed the amendment, 128 to 37. Id. at 2545.
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On May I 0th, Senator Howard of Michigan, acting as co-chairman of the Joint Committee in Fessenden's absence, presented
the proposed amendment to the upper house. Howard's speech,
unlike Stevens', presented in no uncertain terms a powerful and
convincing "broad construction" of the force and scope of the
first section. Taking up the privileges and immunities clause,
he first asserted that any attempt at a precise delineation of rights
under the clause would be "a somewhat barren discussion" principally because the provision in Article IV of the old Constitution
had never been subjected to analysis by the Supreme Court. However, he next cited Justice Washington's enumeration in the
Corfield case and asserted that all these rights would now fall under
federal protection. "To these," he said, "should be ad9-ed the
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution."106 The rights in question, he said,
were all in the present Constitution, but there was no means of
enforcing them against the states. "The great object of the first
section of this amendment," he said, "is, therefore, to restrain the
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees." This would be achieved, he said,
through congressional action under section five, which was "a
direct affirmative delegation of power . . . to carry out all the
principles of all these guarantees. . . ." 107
Howard then presented an extremely latitudinarian interpretation of the due process clause, which he asserted would destroy
all state class legislation entirely:
"The last two clauses of the first section of the amend·ment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the
United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. . . . This
abolishes all class legislati~n in the States, and does away with
106 Id. at 2765. It is worth observing that Howard, at least, assumed that the new
amendment would embody the first eight amendments as a guarantee against the states.
Five years later, in a lengthy speech in the House, Bingham claimed that in drafting section I of the amendment he had followed a suggestion of John Marshall in Barron v.
Baltimore, and had sought deliberately to incorporate the guarantees of the first eight
amendments. "These eight articles •••" he said, "were never limitations upon the power
of the States until made so by the fourteenth amendment." CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
sess., appendix, 84ff (1871). FLACK, THE AnoPTION OF nm FOURTEENUI AMENDMENT,
(1908), asserted long ago that the Joint Committee intended to incorporate the Bill of
Rights in the new amendment. Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?" 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949), however, argues the opposite conclusion, in
the opinion of this writer against the weight of the evidence.

107 GLOBE

2766.
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the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging of a black man
for a crime for which the white man is not hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with
the same shield which it throws over the white man. . . . I
look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth,
as very important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever
disable everyone of them from passing laws trenching on those
fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of
the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be
within their jurisdiction. It establishes equality before the
law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised
of the race the same rights and same protection before the law
as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most
haughty. That, sir, is republican government as I understand
it, and the only one which can claim the praise of a just
Government."108
In the debates which followed, there was a general assumption
of the accuracy of Howard's latitudinarian interpretation. This
meant in turn that there was less disposition in the Senate than
there had been in the House to reassure the moderates that the
first section of the amendment involved nothing more than a
constitutionalization of the Civil Rights Act. In one significant
exchange, indeed, with Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, Fessenden,
as co-chairman of the Joint Committee, undertook to deny categorically that the first section had been inspired by the Civil Rights
Act or indeed had anything to do with it at all. Its contents, he
pointed out, were entirely different, and it made "no reference" to
the disputed law.109 However, Howard broke in to concede
10s Ibid.
109 Id. at

2896. Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin had charged that the first section,
which he said obviously had its origins in the Bingham amendment of February, had been
inspired directly by Bingham's own doubts about the constitutionality of the civil rights
bill, as expressed in debate in. the House. Fessenden retorted indignantly that there was
"not a particle, not a scintilla of truth" in this assertion. H. R. 63, he pointed out, had
originated in the Joint Committee and had been reported out long before the Civil Rights
bill came up for debate there. The Joint Committee, he insisted, had never mentioned
the Civil Rights bill, either in drafting H. R. 63, or in its consideration of the present
section. When Doolittle conceded that he thought the section• had been brought forward
because the committee had "doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress to pass the
civil rights bill," Fessenden replied that "if they had doubts, no such doubts were stated
in the committee of fifteen, and the matter was not put on that grounds at all. There was
no question raised about the civil rights bill." And when Doolittle then asked, "if there
are no doubts, why amend the Constitution on that subject?" Fessenden replied sharply,
"That question the Senator may answer to suit himself. It has no reference to the civil
rights bill."

1956]

THE SEGREGATION QUESTION

1083

that one purpose of the first section was to place the Civil Rights
Act beyond possibility of attack by conservatives,110 while Senator
Poland observed later that the constitutional power of Congress
to "uproot and destroy all such partial State legislation" as violated
"the spirit of the Declaration of Independence" had been "doubted
and denied by persons entitled to high consideration;" hence the
advisability, he said, of writing section one into the Constitution.111
As in the House, however, both friends and opponents of the
amendment spoke in terms of expansive generalizations and
avoided any specific discussion of the immediate impact of section
one on state racial caste legislation. Senator Hendricks of Indiana,
for example, struck a characteristic Conservative note, when he
charged that the section had such force that under it "Congress
might invade the jurisdiction of the States, rob them of their
reserved rights and crown the Federal Government with absolute
and despotic power."112 Garrett Davis in similar vein asserted that
the "real purpose" of the section was to make Negroes citizens,
"to prop the civil rights bill," and to "press . . . [Negroes] forward to a full community of civil and political rights with the white
race."113 Senator Poland, a good Radical, thought on the other
hand that section one expressed "the very spirit and inspiration of
our system of government," as set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.114 Timothy Howe of Wisconsin, another Radical, was almost the only man who became specific;
he singled out for especial condemnation as a type of statute the
section would kill a Florida school segregation law which provided
a separate and inferior school for Negroes, subjected them to a
separate school tax, and cut them off from regular state school
funds.115 Richard Yates of Illinois, on the other hand, adopted an
outright "declaratory" theory of the first section, insisting that
the Thirteenth Amendment already made the Negro a citizen
"entitled to be protected in all his rights and privileges as one of
the citizens of the United States."116
The amendment presently passed both houses by large major110 GLOBE 2896.
111 Id. at 2961.
112 Id. at 2940.
113 Id., appendix
114 Id. at 2961.
115 Id., appendix

at 240.

at 219. Howe's speech can hardly be read as an attack on school
segregation as such; rather it was the inferiority of the Negro school systems and the inequity of the tax system on which he centered his objections.
1161d. at !1037.

1084

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

ities without any resolution of the ambiguous contradiction of the
Radicals' assurances that they proposed merely to constitutionalize
the Civil Rights Act and their proposal to "abolish all class legislation" in the United States. It is probable that the Radicals in
fact had no great desire to resolve that ambiguity, for which there
was a highly plausible explanation in the politics of the moment.
The political situation in Congress in the Spring of 1866 was not
yet entirely clear. President Johnson's influence was rapidly being
destroyed, but there was a substantial bloc of moderate Republicans who had not yet committed themselves entirely to the Radical position. Bingham, Stevens, Morrill, Poland, Howard, Howe
and the other Radicals were dear enough about what they 'Yanted
to accomplish, but if they drove home too far the proposition on
the floor that their amendment would undoubtedly consummate
·the destruction of all caste and class legislation in the states, an
important element of moderate Republican support might be
alienated and the requisite two-thirds majority necessary to the
amendment's adoption might not be obtained. Political strategy
called for ambiguity, not clarity.
This position was the easier to assume for the obvious reason
that the legal phrases incorporated in the amendment could not be
defined exactly as to their probable future legal force and effect.
It was "somewhat barren" as Senator Howard remarked, to attempt
this. This was true because, as observed above, the guarantees in
question were derived principally from the pre-war antislavery
movement, their meaning there was vague and expansive, and
ideological rather than legal; even where the phrases in question
had been in the courts, the Radicals had given them an expansive
ideological content in their own thinking.
So the first section of the amendment had a philosophic and
expansive character which the Radicals refused to define exactly.
As Bingham observed significantly early in the session, "You do not
prohibit murder in the Constitution; you guarantee life in the
Constitution."117 There were vast advantages in this, for if the
political and social currents of the nation consummated the revolutionary implications of the amendment they were writing, then
subsequent judicial and congressional implementation and the
overall dynamism of consequent constitutional growth would
achieve their ultimate purposes. These men were hardly impressed
with the idea of a static constitutional order. The atmosphere,
117Id. at 432.
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as Senator Morrill and Representative Rogers both observed at
one time or another, was "revolutionary."
The same lack of certainty as to the precise scope of civil rights
falling under federal protection by nature of the amendment as
well as its precise effect upon state racial classification legislation
appeared again and again throughout the remainder of the Reconstruction era in subsequent congressional attempts to deal with the
question of civil rights and the Negro. Congressional support for
segregated Negro schools in the District of Columbia and Sumner's
long and unavailing fight to abolish segregated Negro schools in the
District of Columbia has frequently been cited as evidence of congressional intent to apply "narrow construction" to state racial
laws, although technically the parallel is not constitutionally precise or apposite.118 On the other hand, the Radicals were partially
successful in their fight to impose "conditions subsequent" in the
bills "readmitting" several Southern states, whereby anti-segregation provisions were guaranteed in the constitutions of the states
in question_11 9 Again the willingness of Congress to impose such
requirements on the South is not altogether apposite as an indication of its interpretation of the precise force of the amendment on
the states generally. Perhaps the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 ultimately is the most decisive indication of the conviction
of a large majority of the Radicals that Congress might properly
forbid state caste and segregation legislation under the amendment,
but again this law implied congressional power and discretion, not
necessarily the existence of prior mandatory rights enforceable under the amendment alone.120 All this merely proves that the precise
118 See, for example, Judge Prettyman's opinion in Carr v. Corning, (D.C. Cir. 1950)
182 F. (2d) 14 at 17, where he argued that congressional support for segregated schools in
the District of Columbia contemporaneously with the adoption of the amendment was conclusive evidence that Congress had not intended section I to invalidate state school segregation laws.
119 Thus an act to readmit Virginia to representation in Congress imposed on the state
as a condition-subsequent the stipulation, "That the Constitution of Virginia shall never
be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States
of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State." 16 Stat. L.
63 (1870). This provision was the result of a long fight in Congress and in Virginia to
guarantee unsegregated schools in the state.
120 It is important to realize that it was in an atmosphere of fairly severe reaction from
the pro-Negro radicalism of 1866 that the "orthodox" interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment developed, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy v.
Ferguson. The new orthodoxy won such. complete acceptance in both legal and political
thinking that it became extremely difficult to recapture an understanding of either the
spirit or the legal philosophy which. gave birth to the amendment. See WOODWARD, REUNION AND REAcnoN (1951); Graham, "The Fourteenth Amendment and Sch.ool Segregation," 3 BUFFALO L. REv. I (1953).
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meaning of the amendment was an extremely fluid state throughout
the Reconstruction era, as it was in the minds of so many men who
voted for the amendment in 1866.
Perhaps the final comment on the entire problem of the amendment's meaning is the observation that the amendment was now a
part of a living and dynamic constitutional system. Its meaning
consequently was ultimately to reflect through the medium of the
judicial process the evolution of democratic aspiration, will and
myth in the American social order on the question of race and caste.
The post-Reconstruction Conservative reaction was to create a
body of constitutional doctrine which constricted the amendment
into the narrowest possible confines of original intent and came
near frustrating entirely the old Radical equalitarian and humanitarian ideal. In our own time,_ another Radical evolution of socialpolitical ideology has undoubtedly brought the force and intent of
the amendment with respect to race and caste far nearer to the old
antislavery ideal out of which the language of the first section
grew. There is nothing very surprising in this, for the notion of
a static constitution is ultimately a :fiction; the Court merely imposes a kind of stability and continuity upon the evolution of mass
myth and social will as translated into constitutional law. Today,
the meaning of the Constitution represents very nearly the fulfillment of the old Radical dream. The Constitution itself, however,
has not been outraged; rather we still face the ancient and profound question of what constitutes intelligent race policy in a constitutional democracy.

